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WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT. By
Wallace Mendelson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
Pp. 151. $4.00.
One hesitates in deciding where to begin in a discussion of this book.
In Justices Black and Frankfurter: Conflict in the Court, Professor
Mendelson has written an unabashed polemic extolling the virtues of
the latter. It is surprising to hear such a gross over-simplification of
the role that these two great Justices have played in the Court's recent
history from one who claims to possess a deep appreciation for the
complexities of competing interests that face the judiciary. According
to Professor Mendelson, Justice Black is driven so intensely by ideolog-
ical loyalty and sympathy for the "underdog"--e. g. the Negro, labor
unions and the Government's position in antitrust cases-that he does
not conduct himself properly as a judge. Justice Frankfurter, how-
ever, is quite different. For him,
humanitarian ends are served best in that allocation of function
through which the people by a balance of power seek their own
destiny. True to the faith upon which democracy ultimately rests,
the Justice would leave to the political processes the onus of
building legal standards in the vacuum of doubt. For in his view
only that people is free who chooses for itself when choice must
be made.1
And what is the evidence that Professor Mendelson presents us with
in promulgating these far flung generalities? First, he exerts a great
deal of energy in exhibiting to the reader Justice Black's proclivity not
only for hearing cases arising under the Federal Employers Liability
Act but also for deciding them in favor of workers. Professor Mendel-
son thinks that these cases occupy far too much of the Court's time
which could be spent in contemplating larger issues of the day rather
than the mundane problems of workers' injuries. However, in light
of Professor Mendelson's advocacy of an approach to Bill of Rights
cases which would limit the judicial function (although as I shall point
out, I believe that the end result will be the precise opposite) one might
ask, with some justification, if there would not be a resulting time
compensation which would permit the Court to give consideration to
FELA cases.
Professor Mendelson accuses Justice Black of voting according to a
"labor prone pattern." He points out the number of times that Justice
Black has upheld the National Labor Relations Board and the chang-
ing percentage which accompanies the advent of Taft-Hartley and the
Eisenhower Administration.2 It appears that charts and tabulations
1. P. 131. [References are to pages of JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER:
CONFLICT IN THE COURT.]
2. P. 40.
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as to "pro" and "con" votes are quite vogue today3 and they may, in
some instances, be useful. But I would consider their utility, in the
context of attempting to establish a Justice's bias towards a particular
group, highly doubtful. Professor Mendelson completely overlooks the
fact that the Eisenhower Board did stray considerably from the origi-
nal intent of both Wagner and Taft-Hartley, that the entire Court
overruled the Board eleven out of fifteen times from 1959 to 1961, and
that this is a situation which the present Board, by the Chairman's
own admission, is attempting to remedy.-
An atmosphere of special pleading is also conveyed by the author's
citation of Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson5 to indicate Justice Frank-
furter's restraint in implying Congressional pre-emption in the labor
field. Professor Mendelson does not mention the fact that Justice
Frankfurter subsequently reversed his field, indulging in a broad
policy decision in the second Garmon case.6 Incidentally, I fear that
the author would be compelled to admit that Garmon was prompted
by the confusion engendered by the Court's acceptance of the Frank-
furter rationale in Hill." Similarly, in his criticism of the Lincoln Mills
case,8 the author does not point out the chaotic future for litigants
that the Frankfurter opinion in the Westinghouse case9 (predecessor
of Lincoln Mills) foreshadowed.
It is on this note that I find a discussion of the author's attitude
concerning the Bill of Rights and the Court particularly fitting. Here,
most clearly, that lack of certainty mentioned above has been accen-
tuated in the area of civil liberties because of the Court's acceptance of
the "balancing" approach which touches the hearts of Justice Frank-
furter and the author. This approach declines to heed the strong pro-
hibitory language in the Bill of Rights and instead defers, almost
always, to legislative judgment. Thus perpetual litigation is invited
as the individual and government grope through murkiness to ascer-
tain the limits which the Court will set on governmental intrusions
into individual liberty.
3. Hays, The Supreme Court and Labor Law, October Term, 1959, 60 CoLum.
L. Rzv. 901 (1960).
4. Address by Frank W. McCulloch, The How and Why of Recent National
Labor Relations Board Decisions, February 15, 1962.
5. 325 U.S. 538 (1945), cited at p. 101.
6. San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
7. See Gould The Garmon Case: Decline and Threshold of "Litigating Eluci-
dation," 39 U. DET. L.J. 539 (1962).
8. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957), cited at 92, 93.
In this case the Court held that collective bargaining agreements were to be
enforceable in federal court and that federal substantive law was to be applied.
9. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
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Furthermore, such abdication ultimately involves the Court in many
more policy judgments than would an adherence to the so-called
"activist" or "absolutist" position. Thus, it is submitted that the bal-
ancing of rights protected by the Constitution sends the Court down
the exact path that Professor Mendelson finds Justice Black traveling.
Of course, the Court cannot avoid the balancing process in defining
what is protected-e. g., speech. I believe, however, that potential
judicial meddling is at a low ebb when the Court goes through the
balancing process in defining liberty and that the interest demonstrated
by the Founding Fathers in the individual's protection is more certain
to be followed in this manner.10
Justices Black and Frankfurter is rather one-sided in its treatment
of the issues and personalities that divide the Court today. For Pro-
fessor Mendelson there are no in-betweens. The uninitiated reader is
led to the inescapable conclusion that a great struggle between truth
and error is proceeding. This review has, I think, made clear who,
according to the author, possesses the truth.
I believe that this book is in the nature of a brief rather than a
study and, as such, I cannot recommend it to the serious student of
constitutional law.
WILLIAM B. GOULD
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT. By
Frederick M. Rowe. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1962. Pp.
xxx, 675. $22.50.
This book, published in The Trade Regulation Series and edited by
S. Chesterfield Oppenheim, the distinguished scholar of Michigan
University, represents a major contribution to the Series and to anti-
trust literature in general. Written by a practising attorney highly
experienced in the field, it is destined to remain a most useful tool for
lawyers concerned with the perplexing problems of the Robinson-
Patman Act.
Among the chief virtues of the book are depth of analysis, com-
pleteness of material and clarity of expression. Separate chapters are
devoted to each provision of the Act, which is dissected in the light
of its legislative history, economic significance and pertinent adjudica-
tions of the F.T.C. and the Courts.
Born as an effort by grocery wholesalers to curb the aggressive ex-
pansion of the A. & P. Tea Co., the Robinson-Patman Act was given
10. See Charles Black, Mr. Justice Black, The Supreme Court and the Bill of
Rights, Harper's Magazine, Feb. 1961, p. 63.
I Assistant General Counsel, United Auto Workers AFL-CIO.
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